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Introduction and summary 
Mortgages and other forms of household borrowing 
typically require collateral, such as a house or car. 
Typical loan contracts require borrowers to take an 
initial equity stake in the collateral (the down payment) 
and to increase ownership further by repaying the loan’s 
principal before the collateral fully depreciates (amor-
tization). Since the New Deal, government regulation 
has substantially influenced these terms of private 
contracts. In the 1940s and early 1950s, the Federal 
Reserve Board imposed stringent minimum down pay-
ment rates and maximum amortization periods for home 
mortgages, auto loans, and loans to purchase other con-
sumer durable goods. The suspension of these regula-
tions in 1953 allowed consumer credit to grow steadily 
until the credit crunch of August 1966. The financial 
deregulation wave of the late 1970s and early 1980s 
triggered innovations in consumer lending that further 
decreased households’ ownership stakes in their housing 
and other tangible property. Many observers have blamed 
precisely this deregulation for the most recent finan-
cial crisis, so it seems very possible that households’ 
required ownership stakes will be rising as policy-
makers look at their options for improving the regula-
tion of consumer loans and other financial contracts. 
In this article, we employ a model of lending from 
the wealthy to the middle class to evaluate the effects 
of raising the equity requirements of household debt. 
We build on our earlier analysis of the Carter–Reagan 
financial deregulation in Campbell and Hercowitz (2009). 
In that article, we found that lowering equity require-
ments raises the demand for household credit and 
thereby increases the interest rate. This resembles the 
simultaneous increases in household debt and interest 
rates during the mid-1980s, even though we abstract 
from rising government deficits, which are the standard 
explanation for that period’s high interest rates. In this 
article, we examine the implications of reversing this 
process by increasing down payment rates for new 
loans and by forcing all loans to amortize faster. The 
model’s results show that this reform reduces loan  
demand. The interest rate falls 78 basis points over 
three years and then very slowly returns to its level 
before the reform. In an alternative version of our 
model in which producers cannot absorb the capital 
freed by tightening household lending standards, the 
interest rate falls 129 basis points over the three years 
after the reform. These results are potentially of inter-
est to monetary policymakers because they can guide 
an assessment of how financial market reforms im-
pact the “neutral” interest rate required to keep the 
economy’s output at its potential in the absence of 
business cycles. 
In the model, saving households are rentiers living 
off of their wealth, so the low interest rate unambigu-
ously harms them. Nevertheless, the low rate has two 
beneficial effects for borrowers. First, the lower interest 
rate reduces the carrying cost of debt. Second, the 
lower interest rate brings down the user cost of capital 
and thereby encourages investment. These investments 
increase the demand for labor and thereby raise wages. 
Overall, the model’s predictions show that borrowers’ 
welfare gains are equivalent to raising their consump-
tion permanently by 0.9 percent. If we treated the house-
hold credit market in isolation from the rest of the 
economy, then this second effect would be absent.  3 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
In fact, such a market-by-market analysis would be 
misleading; the reform makes borrowers slightly worse 
off after shutting down its indirect effect on wages. 
If tighter lending standards changed neither the 
interest rate nor wages, then they must harm borrowers 
by limiting their choices. Following this intuition about 
the “direct” effects alone leads to the conclusion that 
tighter lending standards primarily harm borrowers. Our 
results show that this intuition can easily be overturned 
by a complete equilibrium analysis that accounts for 
the “indirect” effects of changing prices. Since the re-
form helps some households at the expense of others, 
its assessment requires us to weight the households’ 
utility changes. Even with a specific assumption about 
these weights, the result is only a partial assessment, 
since we have nothing to say about how tightening house-
hold lending standards changes systemic economic risk. 
Our article proceeds as follows. In the next section, 
we review the history of interest rates and household 
debt markets in the United States, paying particular 
attention to households’ ownership stakes in their  
tangible property. Then, we present the model and  
derive its long-run implications for debt and interest 
rates. We show that financial re-regulation has no long-
run effect on interest rates, leaves saving households 
worse off, and improves borrowers’ welfare. Finally, 
we present the complete analysis of the reform. 
Household debt and interest rates  
in the United States
The rise of mass production techniques early in 
the twentieth century created a large volume of stan-
dardized capital goods, such as automobiles, which 
could serve as collateral for credit extended to house-
holds. By the 1920s, most durable household goods 
could be bought “on credit” directly from their retailers. 
The home mortgage market of that decade bears a  
remarkable resemblance to that of the 1990s and 2000s. 
First mortgages had low loan-to-value ratios, and house-
holds often financed the first mortgage’s required down 
payment with second and third mortgages. All of these 
mortgages matured in only a few years, and they re-
quired no repayment of principal before maturing.1 
The Great Depression, World War II, and the Korean 
War dramatically increased government involvement 
in consumer credit markets. In the early 1930s, the 
federal government purchased large volumes of “under-
water” mortgages. These were loans with principals 
exceeding the value of their collateral. It then refinanced 
them with 15-year amortized mortgages, which built 
in the gradual repayment of the principal over the  
15-year amortization period. This amortization directly 
served the policy goal of avoiding a wave of mortgage 
defaults arising from a sudden lack of refinancing  
options. The 15-year amortized mortgage and its  
30-year cousin accounted for most household debt from 
the 1930s through the 1980s, even though they required 
substantial down payments from borrowers.2 The move 
from interest-only short-term loans to long-term am-
ortized debt reduced systemic risk at the cost of keep-
ing potential homeowners with insufficient funds for 
a mortgage’s down payment out of the market. With 
the onset of World War II, the Federal Reserve Board 
tightened loan standards further by issuing Regulations X 
and W. These dictated restrictive maximum loan-to-
value ratios and amortization periods for home mort-
gages (Regulation X) and other collateralized consumer 
credit (Regulation W). 
The Federal Reserve suspended enforcement  
of Regulations X and W near the end of the Korean 
War in 1953. Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of 
credit markets since 1952. The data come from the 
Federal Reserve Board’s Flow of Funds Accounts of 
the United States. The dashed line in figure 1 shows 
the ratio of all mortgage debt on owner-occupied 
housing relative to this housing stock’s value, and the 
solid line represents the ratio of all household debt to 
all tangible assets of households, which include the 
stock of owner-occupied real estate and the stock of 
automobiles owned by households. Since these are 
both useful measures of household leverage (the use 
of debt to finance investment), we refer to them hence-
forth as leverage ratios. 
The wartime credit restrictions made these lever-
age ratios very low: They both equal about 0.195 in 
the first quarter of 1952. Throughout the 1950s, both 
ratios rise dramatically. The overall leverage ratio 
(the solid line in figure 1) peaks at 0.38 in the fourth 
quarter of 1965. At that time, the Federal Reserve’s 
Regulation Q placed a cap on the permissible interest 
rate paid on savings accounts. During the credit crunch 
of August 1966, market interest rates exceeded this 
cap, and the resulting outflow of funds from savings 
and loans and other traditional sources of mortgages 
reduced the availability of household credit. 
The mid-1960s marked a turning point for house-
hold leverage ratios. They declined (not always steadily) 
until the enactment of the Garn–St Germain Depository 
Institutions Act in the last quarter of 1982. This act and 
the Monetary Control Act of 1980 eliminated many 
restrictions on mortgage lending. Along with the con-
current growth of mortgage debt securitization, these 
changes fueled a second wave of post-war household 
leverage growth. In the first quarter of 1983, both ratios 
equaled about 0.30. By the first quarter of 1995, they 
both equaled 0.41. 4 1Q/2010, Economic Perspectives
FIgURE 1
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts 
of the United States (Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z.1). 
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Throughout the credit expansion of 
the late 1990s and the early 2000s, these 
ratios rarely exceeded 0.45. Home prices 
began to decline in the middle of 2006, 
mechanically raising the household lever-
age ratios. This continued until the first 
quarter of 2009, when both ratios equaled 
about 0.58. The most recently available 
data come from the second quarter of 
2009, and they show the leverage ratios 
declining. Of course, the leverage ratios’ 
common recent spike emanated from a 
loss in the value of previously mortgaged 
properties rather than from any deliberate 
loosening of mortgage terms. With their 
mortgages considered underwater, many 
homeowners chose to delay repayment or 
default outright. The financial turmoil 
that arose from the resulting impairment 
of mortgage debt has led most observers 
to reassess the need for tighter mortgage 
standards. Therefore, we expect these 
household leverage ratios to continue 
their declines as creditors write off their 
bad debts (thus reducing household in-
debtedness) and as lenders raise required 
down payments and principal repayment 
rates on newly issued loans. Furthermore, the possi-
bility of congressionally mandated changes to finan-
cial market regulation might either directly or indirectly 
lead to tighter standards for household credit. 
We expect tighter loan standards to reduce demand 
for credit, thereby lowering interest rates. To get a sense 
of how much lower we could expect them to go, we 
plot the yield on three-year constant-maturity zero-
coupon U.S. Treasury debt in figure 2. To account  
for the effects of anticipated inflation on these interest 
rates, we have subtracted from each of them the most 
recent four-quarter percentage change in the Personal 
Consumption Expenditures Price Index. The yield’s 
average over the time period plotted (the fourth quarter 
of 1953 through the third quarter of 2009) is 2.6 percent. 
The most noticeable feature of the data is the  
familiar rise in real interest rates associated with the 
Federal Reserve’s policy of targeting the growth rate 
of money that began in the fourth quarter of 1979 and 
ended in the fourth quarter of 1982. To get a better sense 
of the relationship between credit demand and inter-
est rates, we remove this period and that of the recent 
financial crisis from the analysis. For the remainder, 
we have calculated average interest rates for the peri-
ods defined by turning points of the household lever-
age ratios in figure 1: These are 1953:Q4–1966:Q3, 
1966:Q4–1979:Q3, 1983:Q1–1995:Q4, and 
1996:Q1–2007:Q2. The results are 1.94 percent,  
1.33 percent, 4.50 percent, and 2.45 percent. Thus,  
it appears that the interest rate rose at the same time 
household leverage ratios were growing in the 1980s 
and early 1990s, and a decline in interest rates accom-
panied the end of both growth spurts in figure 1. An 
explanation of interest rates that focuses only on house-
hold leverage ratios is clearly incomplete. For exam-
ple, contemporaries attributed the high interest rates 
of the 1980s to that era’s high government deficits.3 
Nevertheless, the association between interest rates 
and changes in household leverage seems strong enough 
to merit further quantitative exploration. We next present 
a theoretical framework for doing so. 
A model of household debt and  
interest rates
Much of modern macroeconomic theory builds 
on the useful fiction that identical infinitely lived 
households populate the economy. This will not do 
for the question at hand because two identical house-
holds have no incentive to lend to each other. Accord-
ingly, our model of household debt and interest rates 
has two representative households, which we call the 
borrower and the saver. The borrower is less patient 5 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
FIgURE 2
Notes: The shaded areas indicate official periods of recessions as 
identified by the National Bureau of Economic Research; the dashed 
vertical line indicates the most recent business cycle peak. See the  
text for further details.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Federal Reserve  
Bank of St. Louis.
Inflation-adjusted three-year constant-maturity interest rates, 
1953:Q4–2009:Q3
percentage points
than the saver. The difference in patience motivates the 
(heads of) households to live up to the names we have 
assigned them. If the borrower’s debts were limited only 
by her ability to repay them, then she would never stop 
borrowing more. As time passes, she would spend more 
and more on interest payments and less and less on her 
own consumption.4 This is grossly unrealistic for the 
United States as a whole. Another feature of our model—
collateral requirements—inhibits the never-ending 
expansion of debt. In the long run, the saver’s consumption– 
savings decisions determine the interest rate. At that rate, 
the borrower would like to expand her debts. However, 
the collateral requirement inhibits her from doing so. 
As noted previously, most household debts require 
the borrower to hold an equity stake in the good serv-
ing as collateral. The borrower’s down payment is the 
equity stake at purchase, and the equity stake grows 
as the borrower repays the loan’s principal. In the model, 
two parameters determine the borrower’s equity re-
quirements. Because the history of household debt in 
the United States indicates that government regulation 
substantially influences equity requirements, we view 
the two equity requirement parameters as being set by 
policy.5 In Campbell and Hercowitz (2009), we mod-
eled the expansion of leverage following the financial 
market deregulation of the early 1980s as a reduction 
of government-set equity requirements. To 
consider the effects of anticipated increas-
es in equity requirements on the interest 
rate, we now reverse that experiment by 
raising the equity requirement parameters. 
Next, we present the model of house-
hold debt and interest rates. We begin by 
describing the two households’ preferences. 
We then lay out the economy’s technolo-
gy for producing goods, and we finish 
with a discussion of both households’ 
consumption and savings choices in a 
competitive equilibrium. 
Consumer choices
Both the saver and the borrower value 
the consumption of two goods. The first 
good is nondurable and stands in for items 
such as food, energy, and entertainment 
services. The second good represents the 
use of durable goods such as housing, 
furniture, automobiles, and consumer 
electronics. Both individuals can adjust 
their consumption of these goods once 
every calendar quarter. 
We denote the quantity of the nondu-
rable good consumed in quarter t by the 
borrower with  t C .
∧
 The analogous quantity for the saver 
is  t C ￿ . Similarly, we represent the quantities of the dura-
ble good used by the borrower and saver in quarter t 
with  t S
∧
 and  t S ￿ . Henceforth, we use A
∧
 and   A  to repre-
sent borrower- and saver-specific versions of A. 
If these households are to make consumption and 
savings decisions, then they need to know how to trade 
off nondurable and durable consumption in the present 
quarter and how to balance consuming more of either 
good today versus saving to enable more consumption 
in the future. For this, we suppose that they plan how 
much of both goods to consume in the present quarter 
and in every future quarter. We denote a plan for the 
borrower’s nondurable consumption from quarter t
onward with  , , , , . C C C C C C
t
t t t t




∧ ∧ ∧ ∧ ∧ ∧
 The
borrower’s analogous plan for durable consumption
is   , , , , . S S S S S S
t




∧ ∧ ∧ ∧ ∧ ∧
t
+  We suppose 
that for each possible plan, the borrower computes a 
utility value U C S
t t , ( )
∧ ∧ ∧
, using the following formula:
, ln ln , . U C S S C C S
t t t t
t t ( )= + − ( ) + ( )




∧ ∧ ∧ ∧ ∧ ∧
The parameters θ and 
∧
β both lie between zero 
and one. This says that the utility value of following  
a plan equals the felicity from the current quarter’s 
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consumption, θ θ ln n , S C t t +( ) 1
∧ ∧
– plus the value of 




The saver’s utility value of a given plan can be 
calculated from his analogous equation: 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ U C S S C U C S
t t
t t
t t , ln ln , . ( )= + − ( ) + ( )
+ + θ θ β 1
1 1
The value of θ here equals its value in the borrower’s 
utility rule, so both households agree on how to divide 
an allocation of income for the current quarter between 
nondurable goods and (the services from) durable 
goods to make felicity as large as possible. However, 
the saver’s discount factor ￿ β exceeds the borrower’s 
discount factor β
∧
. In this sense, the borrower is less 
patient than the saver. The borrower would prefer to 
trade the saver’s best possible consumption plan for 
one of equal cost, but with higher consumption in the 
present and lower consumption in the future. 
Production of income and accumulation of wealth
Each quarter, the economy inherits three stocks 
of capital goods from the previous quarter. The first is 
the stock of market capital. We denote the number of 
machines in the stock of market capital available in 
quarter t with Kt. Combining these machines with Nt 
hours of work (provided in principle by either house-
hold) yields an output of Y K N t t t =
− 1 α α, measured in 
units of the nondurable consumption good. After pro-
duction, a fraction λ of the machines stop working. 
Investments in machines, It , can replace those lost to 
depreciation and (if sufficiently large) expand the 
stock of machines available for the next quarter. Thus, 
K K I t t t + = − + . 1 1 ( ) λ
The remaining two stocks inherited from the pre-
vious quarter are the two households’ stocks of home 
capital, that is, durable goods. We assume that the 
flow of services from a stock of home capital is pro-
portional to its size, so that we use  t S
∧
 and  t S   to rep-
resent each of the households’ durable goods stocks 
as well as the flows of services forthcoming from 
them. Just as with market capital, the home capital 
goods depreciate and can be replaced and expanded 
with investment. The two stocks’ common deprecia-
tion rate equals δ, and their respective investments 
are  t X
∧
 and   Xt. Therefore, 




￿ ￿ ￿ S S X t t t + = − ( ) + 1 1 δ .
All income in the economy can be directed to-
ward one of the following uses: each household’s 
nondurable consumption, investment in each house-
hold’s stock of home capital, or investment in the 
stock of market capital. It is costless to convert one 
unit of income into one unit of any of these goods. 
Since the uses of income cannot exceed that avail-
able, we have 
t t t t t t C C X X I Y + + + + ≤   ￿ ￿
∧ ∧
  .
The households face two other substantial limits 
on their accumulation of capital. First, the machines 
in the stock of market capital may not be converted 
into consumption goods of either kind. This makes 
sense for most capital goods because blast furnaces 
and airliners are of little use to the typical consumer. 
We impose this limit by requiring that It ≥ 0. Second, 
neither household may sell durable goods from their 
stocks of home capital. That is, Xt ≥0
∧
 and   Xt ³0. 
Obviously, households can and do sell their durable 
goods all of the time. However, we find this assump-
tion reasonable when we suppose that the model’s 
borrower and saver represent two classes of individu-
als with different tastes. If the saver is rich and con-
sumes mansions while the borrower is middle class 
and consumes bungalows, then the restriction means 
that we cannot convert mansions into bungalows and 
vice versa. 
Trade and competition
We have now described how the two households 
rank consumption plans and the technology available 
for implementing them. We will now present how the 
households implement these plans by reviewing a 
typical quarter’s trades in the sequence they occur. 
We then describe the collateral requirements that re-
strict the households’ debts and finish with a presen-
tation of the conditions required for markets to clear. 
The sequence of trades in a quarter
At the beginning of quarter t, the households own 
their stocks of durable goods; stocks of market capital, 
  t K
∧
 and  t K ￿  ; and financial assets (bonds),  t B
∧
 and  t B ￿ .
Production takes place at a representative firm.  
It rents capital from the households and combines it 
with labor to produce income. The cost of renting one 
machine in quarter t is Ht , and the cost of one hour of 7 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
work is Wt  . Capital and labor employed at each firm 
are chosen to maximize its profits. After production 
takes place, the representative firm makes its required 
rental payments to the owners of capital, returns the 
undepreciated capital goods to their owners, and pays 
its wage bill. We think of the saver as representing the 
wealthiest families in the United States, so we suppose 
that he spends all of his time on leisure activities and 
offers none to the labor market. The borrower represents 
the middle class, so we suppose that she offers N hours 
of work to the market regardless of the wage she earns 
for each one. Thus, the saver’s wage income equals 
zero always, while the borrower’s is Wt            N. 
The funds available to either household is the sum 
of that household’s labor earnings, the rents it receives 
for the use of its market capital, and its stock of bonds. 
It can put these funds to one of four uses. Three of 
these—nondurable consumption, investment in home 
capital, and investment in market capital—have already 
been covered. The fourth use of funds is the purchase 
of new bonds. All bonds pay one unit of the nondura-
ble consumption good in the next quarter, and their 
price in the current quarter is 1/Rt , where Rt is the 
gross rate of interest. With this in place, we can write 
the two households’ budget constraints as 
C X I B R W N H K B t t t t t t t + + + / ≤ + +1
∧ ∧ ∧ ∧ ∧ ∧
t t +
and
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ C X I B R H K B t t t t t t t + + + / +1 . t ≤ +
Collateral requirements
A household can choose any positive value of bonds      
( t B +1
∧
 or   t B +1 ￿  ) that is consistent with its budget constraint. 
When either of these bond stocks is negative, we say 
that household is indebted. An indebted household 
must pledge some or all of its home capital stock as 
collateral. We denote the maximum debts that can be 
collateralized by the two households’ home capital 
stocks with  t V
∧
 and  t V ￿. So, we require: 
t t B V − ≤
∧ ∧
and
. t t B V ￿ ￿ − ≤
We specify these maximum debts with
V V X t t t + = − ( ) + − ( ) 1 1 1 φ π
∧ ∧ ∧
and
￿ ￿ ￿ V V X t t t + = − ( ) + − ( ) . 1 1 1 π φ
Here, 1 – π is the maximum loan-to-value ratio allowed 
for household debt, and φ is the rate at which the princi-
pal must be repaid. If φ = δ, then the borrower must 
repay the principal only to the extent that depreciation 
erodes the collateral’s value. If instead φ > δ, then the 
borrower must accumulate equity in the collateral as 
it ages. We adopt the specification requiring the geo-
metric repayment of principal because it greatly sim-
plifies the ensuing analysis. 
Market clearing and equilibrium
The evolution of the model economy can be com-
pletely described by a collection of plans for current 
and future nondurable consumption, durable consump-
tion, market capital, and collateral values, as well as 
the sequences of the wage rate, the rental rate of capital, 
and the interest rate. We say that such a collection is 
an equilibrium if the households’ consumption plans 
maximize their utility values given their incomes; the 
representative firm maximizes its profit given the wage 
and interest rate; and the demands for bonds, market 
capital, and labor always equal their corresponding 
supplies. The interested reader can find a more tech-
nical definition of equilibrium in box 1. 
The model’s steady state
Next, we examine how the steady-state values of 
the model’s key outcomes change with parameters so 
that we can gain intuition valuable for interpreting the 
model’s dynamics. By definition, a steady state is an 
equilibrium in which all of the variables are constant 
over time. Therefore, a household’s borrowing con-
straint binds either always or never. It is tedious but not 
difficult to show that only the less patient household’s 
borrowing constraint binds in the steady state. 
For our purposes, the three key variables of inter-
est are the interest rate and the two households’ lever-
age ratios (their stocks of outstanding household 
debts divided by the values of their household capital 
stocks). To characterize all of these variables, we first 
need to consider both households’ optimal consump-
tion and savings choices. Suppose that the saver begins 
with a utility-maximizing steady-state consumption 
plan with nondurable consumption   C and changes it 
slightly by decreasing consumption in year t by Δ > 0, 8 1Q/2010, Economic Perspectives
investing the proceeds in bonds, and consuming the 
principal and interest in year t + 1. By its construction, 
this experiment leaves consumption in all years after  
t + 1 unchanged. If Δ is small, then the utility loss 
in year t is ∆/  C  and the discounted utility gain in 
year t + 1 equals ￿ ￿ β ∆ R C / . Here, R is the steady-state 
interest rate. Since the original consumption plan max-
imized utility, this slight change cannot increase utility. 
The change also cannot lower utility because if it did, 
then the analogous experiment that increases consump-
tion in year t by borrowing Δ and repaying it in year 










Eliminating common terms from both sides yields 
our first important result,  / R = 1 ￿  β. That is, the saver’s 
discount rate determines the steady-state rate of inter-
est alone. Credit market regulation that changes either 
π and φ has no long-run effect on the interest rate. 
Since the borrower is less patient than the saver, 
the experiment of borrowing Δ in year t and paying it 
back at the interest rate  / 1 ￿ β in year t + 1 would increase 
her utility. However, the collateral requirements pre-
vent her from doing this. Since the borrower exhausts 
her borrowing opportunities in the steady state, we 










Thus, increasing either π or φ directly reduces the 
borrower’s leverage ratio in the long run. Since the 
saver purchases bonds, we set his leverage ratio to zero. 
Quantitative analysis of increasing  
equity requirements
Although the steady-state analysis reveals that 
equity requirements have no long-run effect on inter-
est rates, it does not rule out substantial short-run effects 
in the wake of a reform. Investigating this possibility 
requires a quantitative analysis of the model’s equi-
librium, which we provide here. For this, we assign 
values to the model’s parameters that reflect the equity 
BOX 1
Equilibrium definition
Building upon the notation we used for the two 
households’ consumption plans, we denote the path  
for any quantity or price At with At = (At , At+1, …). 
For a collection of plans to form an equilibrium,  
they must satisfy the following five conditions. 
1)   Given  , , , , , K S B R H W t t t t
t t t ,  ,  and V
∧ ∧ ∧ ∧
 the bor-
  rower’s plans for C S X K I B V
t t t t t t t and
∧ ∧ ∧ ∧ ∧ ∧ ∧
, , , , , ,
n  are consistent with the initial given values 
of   , , , ; K S B V t t t t and
∧ ∧ ∧ ∧
n  obey the rules for accumulating market 
capital, home capital, and collateral value; 
n  satisfy the borrower’s borrowing and 
budget constraints in every quarter; and 
n  yield a higher utility value for the borrower 
than any other plans that satisfy this condi-
tion’s other requirements.  
2)   Given      K S B V t t t t , , , , R   
t, H   
t, and W   
t, the saver’s 
plans for  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ C S X K I B V
t t t t t t t , , and , , , ,  
n  are consistent with the initial given values 
of  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ K S B V t t , , ; and t t ,  
n  obey the rules for accumulating market 
capital, home capital, and collateral value; 
n  satisfy the saver’s borrowing and 
budget constraints in every quarter; and 
n  yield a higher utility value for the saver 
than any other plans that satisfy this condi-
tion’s other requirements.  
3)  For all τ > 0,  . B B t t + + + = ￿ 0
∧
τ τ
4)  For all τ > 0, K K K t t t + + + = + . ￿
∧
τ τ τ
5)  For all τ > 0, Kt  +  τ and N are the capital and labor 
choices that maximize the representative firm’s 
profits given Ht and Wt    . 
The first two conditions just require each of  
the households to do the best they can (measured 
with their utility values) with what they have got. 
The third condition states that the net supply of  
risk-free bonds in the economy equals zero. Thus,  
if one household wishes to borrow, the other must 
lend. The fourth condition says that the economy’s 
stock of market capital must equal the sum of the 
two households’ market capital stocks. And the final 
condition requires the rental rate of capital and the 
wage rate to induce the profit-maximizing represen-
tative firm to rent the entire available capital stock 
and employ all of the available hours of work. 9 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
    TABlE 1
Calibrated parameter values
Equity requirement  π  φ  α  λ  δ      θ
High  0.16  0.0315
      0.3  0.025  0.01 
1
1.01
           
1
1.015   0.37
Low  0.11  0.0186
Note: See the text for further details.
Source: Campbell and Hercowitz (2009). 
￿ β β
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requirements of household debt typical of the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. After calculating the model’s steady 
state with these values, we raise the equity requirement 
parameters to values more typical of the period be-
fore the financial deregulation of the early 1980s. We 
then calculate the model’s equilibrium paths for all 
quantities and prices when households start with the 
capital and debt stocks from the initial steady state  
(associated with low equity requirements) but face the 
new higher equity requirement parameters. In the long 
run, the economy’s interest rate, its capital stocks, and 
the debt owed by the borrower to the saver converge 
to their values in the steady state calculated with the 
new parameters. We focus on the model economy’s 
transition from the initial steady state to the other 
steady state following the parameter change. 
Table 1 lists the parameter values we use for this 
experiment. All of them are taken from our earlier anal-
ysis of credit market deregulation in Campbell and 
Hercowitz (2009). We consider two configurations for 
the equity requirement parameters: high and low. In 
both cases, π equals the average of typical down pay-
ments on homes and automobiles weighted by their 
shares of durable purchases, and φ equals the average 
repayment rates of home mortgages and automobile 
loans weighted by their shares of household debt. The 
parameters for the high regime were chosen using ob-
servations of household debt and loan terms from before 
the financial liberalization of 1983, while the choice 
of the low regime’s parameters used similar observa-
tions from 1995 through 2001. The required down pay-
ment for a home capital good equals 16 percent of its 
value in the high regime and 11 percent in the low re-
gime. The model’s remaining parameters are held con-
stant across the two regimes. Campbell and Hercowitz 
(2009) provide justification for the specific values chosen. 
We note here only that the choice of ￿ β produces an 
annual steady-state interest rate of 4.02 percent. 
For our experiment, we start the economy at the 
model’s steady state calculated with the parameters 
from the low regime. We suppose that, without  
warning, the parameters switch to those of the high 
regime. Both of the model’s households expect the 
change to be permanent. Given the initial values of 
, , , , , , S V B B S K t t t t t t ￿ ￿ ￿ and
∧ ∧ ∧
from the steady state associated 
with low equity requirements, we calculate the model’s 
equilibrium. Figure 3 contains plots of the resulting 
equilibrium paths for the model’s key variables. Panels A, 
B, C, and D plot the values of both households’ consump-
tion choices, and panels E and F display the evolution 
of the productive capital stock and the wage. All of these 
have been scaled so that their values in the original 
steady state equal 100 percent. Panel G shows the interest 
rate in annual percentage points, and panel H shows 
the household leverage ratio in percentage points. 
In the model, there are two reasons for the borrower 
to purchase durable goods: They create a flow of valu-
able services, and they enable the expansion of debt. 
The re-regulation of household debt markets reduces 
the size of this second incentive, and so the reform 
initially makes the borrower wish to reduce her stock 
of durable goods. Indeed, the borrower purchases no 
durable goods for six quarters following the re-regulation 
(figure 3, panel A). This decline in durable purchases 
together with the acceleration of principal repayment 
required by the higher value of φ reduces loan demand, 
so both the interest rate and the household leverage ratio 
fall as expected. The leverage ratio starts at 38.17 per-
cent, falls rapidly while the borrower purchases no 
durable goods, and then declines more gradually toward 
its new long-run level of 23.37 percent (figure 3,  
panel H). The interest rate falls rapidly from its initial 
value of 4.02 percent to its trough three years after  
re-regulation, 3.24 percent—a decrease of 78 basis 
points (figure 3, panel G). Thereafter, the interest rate 
rises very slowly towards its steady-state value. Even 
25 years after re-regulation, the interest rate is 36 basis 
points below its original value. Apparently, it takes a 
long time indeed to reach the long run. 10 1Q/2010, Economic Perspectives
FIgURE 3
The model’s equilibrium following financial re-regulation
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    TABlE 2
Consumption-equivalent welfare changes
  Borrower   Saver
  
Baseline experiment (percent)  0.9   –8.4  
Fixed K (percent)  –0.1   –4.8
Note: See the text for further details.
A note on welfare
In this article, we have examined  
interest rates in the wake of the deregula-
tion and re-regulation of financial markets. 
Appropriate monetary policy requires  
understanding and forecasting persistent 
interest rate changes, so our results can 
contribute to that discussion. However, 
for those who set financial market policy, 
the interest rate serves only as a means to 
an end. Policymakers instead concern themselves 
with how adopting a given policy changes the welfare 
of borrowers and savers. In the model, we can measure 
welfare with the two households’ utility values after the 
policy change. Comparing these with the analogous 
utility values from the pre-reform steady state provides 
the desired welfare assessment. 
Before reporting on the actual welfare changes, 
it is worth returning to figure 3. It shows that after  
25 years, the saver consumes much less of both goods 
than he did before the reform (panels C and D). At 
the same time, the borrower consumes more of both 
goods (panels A and B). Although the economy has 
not yet reached its new steady state in that time, these 
changes also characterize the long run. Therefore, the 
reform unambiguously increases the borrower’s wel-
fare while decreasing the saver’s. 
The long-run welfare changes are only tangentially 
interesting for policymakers; they care about the total 
welfare change that accounts for the short-run transi-
tion from one steady state to another. In the short  
run, the borrower’s consumption of both goods falls 
(figure 3, panels A and B). The saver’s nondurable 
consumption slowly trends down (panel D). The saver’s 
durable purchases rise to peak at about 10 percent above 
their pre-reform level, and then fall to their new steady 
state value (panel C). 
In principle, the borrower’s short-run utility loss 
could dominate her welfare calculation. This would 
be intuitive because re-regulation imposes a constraint 
on her decisions. The actual utility changes reported 
in table 2 show that this is not the case. The utility 
values themselves have no meaningful units, so all  
of the table’s entries give the permanent percentage 
change in the consumption of both goods (starting 
from the original steady state) required to make the 
household’s utility equal to its post-reform value. 
In table 2, the first row reports the results for the 
experiment plotted in figure 3. The borrower’s welfare 
change equals that from permanently and instantly rais-
ing her consumption of both durable and nondurable 
goods by 0.9 percent. The borrower is better off, even 
though she faces tighter constraints on her borrowing. 
This would be impossible if the interest rate she pays 
on her debts and the wage she receives for her labor 
were held constant. Of course, both of these variables 
also change in the short run, and the changes are favor-
able to the borrower: The interest rate falls, and the 
wage rises. These two are actually tightly connected. 
The interest rate decline increases the capital employed 
by the representative firm, which in turn raises wages. 
Put differently, the re-regulation induces the saver to 
invest more in productive capital and thereby benefit 
the borrower indirectly with higher wages.7
To determine whether the “direct” effect of lower 
interest rates or the “indirect” effect of higher wages 
contributes more to the borrower’s welfare gain, we 
have run an experiment with the model in which we 
hold the stock of market capital fixed at its original 
steady-state level. Put differently, we force the saver 
to replace depreciated market capital and do not allow 
any further investment. In this experiment, the inter-
est rate falls 129 basis points (to 2.73 percent) over 
three years; the wage remains constant by construction. 
In table 2, the row for fixed K reports the consumption 
equivalent welfare changes analogous to those from the 
previous experiment. Even though the fall in interest 
rates is much larger than before, the borrower’s welfare 
gain becomes a loss. The change also cuts the saver’s 
welfare loss substantially. Apparently, the indirect effects 
of financial re-regulation on consumer welfare can 
easily dominate its more easily envisioned direct effects.8
Since tightening consumer lending standards helps 
one household at the expense of the other, it is impos-
sible to unambiguously state that such a policy change 
helps or hurts “society as a whole.” A policymaker 
who cares only for the borrower would prefer tighter 
lending standards, while one who represents the saver’s 
interests would be against them. A policymaker who 
wishes to keep both households’ considerations in mind 
can come to either conclusion depending on the weights 
she assigns to the two households’ preferences. We 
have been silent regarding how many “real” households 
the borrower and saver each represent because that 
detail is actually irrelevant for the model’s equilibrium. 
As long as no single household thinks that it can  12 1Q/2010, Economic Perspectives
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influence the wage or interest rate, nothing changes if 
we divide either household into 10, 100, or 1,000 
smaller (but identical) households. 
Nevertheless, the number of “actual” borrowers 
and savers clearly matters for a policymaker’s welfare 
calculations. In our favored interpretation of the model, 
the saver represents the 5 percent or 10 percent of 
households with the highest wealth, and the borrower 
represents the remainder. If 5 percent of households 
are savers, then tightening lending standards increases 
the average utility value of all households. However, the 
same tightening decreases average utility if 10 percent 
of households are savers. Therefore, we have little con-
crete advice to give a policymaker who wishes to base 
her judgment on changes in average utility. That is, we 
can identify winners and losers from tightening lend-
ing standards, but assessing whether or not this im-
proves society lies well beyond our capabilities. 
Conclusion
Empirically, times of expanding home leverage 
have had higher-than-average interest rates. Interest 
rates in the United States during the post-Korean  
War surge in household leverage were about 60 basis 
points higher than their average in the period immedi-
ately after the leverage ratio had peaked. Similarly, 
interest rates fell about 200 basis points when the sec-
ond sustained increase in household leverage ratios 
ended in 1995 (recall our discussion of figures 1 and 2). 
Of course, macroeconomic events other than changes 
in credit market regulation substantially influence in-
terest rates. Nevertheless, these results give a range 
within which reasonable model predictions for the  
interest rate effects of financial re-regulation should 
fall. In the baseline version of our model in which  
the saver accumulates market capital, the interest rate 
falls 78 basis points over three years after financial 
re-regulation. Thereafter, the interest rate rises very 
slowly back to its original level. If we instead suppose 
that the stock of market capital is fixed and cannot be 
augmented, the analogous decline is about 130 basis 
points. These two specifications embody two extreme 
assumptions on the costs of adjusting market capital: 
none and infinite. Accordingly, we argue that any  
persistent decline in interest rates between 78 basis 
points and 130 basis points is a reasonable forecast  
in the wake of financial re-regulation. 
1See Semer et al. (1986) and Olney (1991) for more information 
about household credit markets before the Great Depression.
2Green and Wachter (2005) provide a history of the spread of amortized 
mortgages in the United States.
3See Friedman (1992) for a discussion of government deficits and 
interest rates in the 1980s. Campbell and Hercowitz (2009) argue 
that rising demand for credit must have contributed to that decade’s 
high interest rates because otherwise household indebtedness would 
have declined as government deficits increased interest rates.
4Becker (1980) describes this long-run behavior of household indebt-
edness in detail.
5For an alternative view, see Kiyotaki (1998). He discusses one 
environment of limited commitment in which the creditors require 
down payments because collateral loses value upon repossession.
6To calculate  ( ) U C S
t t , ,
∧ ∧ ∧
 choose a large integer τ and artificially
set  ( ) U C S
t t + + ,
∧ ∧ ∧ τ   τ  to zero. Next, use the equation to calculate 
( ) ( ) ( U C S U C S C S
t t t t + − + − + − , , , ,
τ τ τ τ 1 1 2 2 t t )
∧ ∧ ∧
U
∧ ∧ ∧ ∧ + − ..., ,
∧ ∧
. This calculation 
is obviously incorrect because the assumption upon which it is 




 which gets very small as τ becomes larger.
7It is important to note here that the borrower’s welfare increase does 
not reflect a paternalistic assumption built into the model that regu-
lators can make better financial decisions than individual borrowers. 
Instead, it reflects the benefits accruing to all borrowers from them 
simultaneously reducing their loan demand. In this sense, financial 
re-regulation has the same effects as would the formation of a bor-
rowers’ cartel to limit the demand for loans. All of the borrowers 
are made better off if they stick to the cartel agreement, but each 
one of them would like to deviate and expand her indebtedness so 
long as the others conform.
8In this experiment, the saver’s welfare improves when his choices 
over market capital are restricted. Just as before with the borrower’s 
welfare following financial re-regulation, this welfare improvement 
can be interpreted as a cartelization of savers. If all savers commit 
to not increasing market capital, they can all avoid paying higher 
wages on the transition path. This increases their welfare, even 
though it further reduces the interest rate. Of course, each individual 
saver would like to expand his purchases of market capital if all 
other savers stick to the cartel agreement.13 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
REFERENCES
Becker, R. A., 1980, “On the long-run steady state in 
a simple dynamic model of equilibrium with hetero-
geneous households,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 95, No. 2, September, pp. 375–382.
Campbell, J. R., and Z. Hercowitz, 2009, “Welfare 
implications of the transition to high household debt,” 
Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 56, No. 1, 
January, pp. 1–16. 
Friedman, B. M., 1992, “Learning from the Reagan 
deficits,” American Economic Review, Vol. 82, No. 2, 
May, pp. 299–304. 
Green, R. K., and S. M. Wachter, 2005, “The American 
mortgage in historical and international context,” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 19, No. 4, 
Fall, pp. 93–114. 
Kiyotaki, N., 1998, “Credit and business cycles,” 
Japanese Economic Review, Vol. 49, No. 1, March, 
pp. 18–35. 
Olney, M. L., 1991, Buy Now, Pay Later: Advertising, 
Credit, and Consumer Durables in the 1920s, Chapel 
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. 
Semer, M. P., J. H. Zimmerman, J. M. Frantz, 
and A. Ford, 1986, “Evolution of federal legislative 
policy in housing: Housing credits,” in Housing and 
the New Financial Markets, R. L. Florida (ed.), New 
Brunswick, NJ: Center for Urban Policy Research, 
pp. 25–31. 
 